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Since the mid-1980s, it has become increasingly popular to research contemporary economic 
globalization through the lens of cities (see, for instance, Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 1991; 
Castells, 1996; Taylor, 2004). One strand of research thereby focuses on the global 
‘command-and-control function’ of major cities, which is often measured through the 
presence of corporate headquarters of major multinational enterprises (MNEs; see, for 
instance, Godfrey and Zhou, 1999; Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Taylor et al., 2009). 
Following this lead, this commentary has three related purposes. First, we aim to take stock of 
how European cities have fared as global command-and-control centres in the wake of the 
financial crisis in 2008 and the lingering Euro crisis throughout most of 2011. To this end, we 
explore the shifting positions of leading European cities in their role as MNE headquarter 
locations in the period 2006-11. Second, based on an interpretation of our empirical findings, 
we critically interrogate the conceptual purchase of mere MNE headquarter location as a 
measure of the command-and-control function of cities. And third, using Castells’ (1992) 
work on the ‘Informational City’, we briefly explore the possible long-term consequences for 
European cities. 
Data and methodology 
We use data from the ‘Forbes Global 2000’ database for the years 2006 and 2011. This 
database contains information on the world’s largest 2000 companies as measured by a 
composite ranking for sales, profits, assets, and market value. We concentrate on firms’ 
turnover and market value, and assign this value to the companies’ headquarter city as given 
in the Forbes database. Headquarter locations were thereby integrated into urban 
agglomerations as defined by the national statistical offices for reasons of consistency 
(corporate headquarters are frequently located in the wider metropolitan region of major 
cities). In addition, to avoid idiosyncratic results, we only included cities that had at least 
three company headquarters in either 2006 or 2011. About two thirds of the urban 
agglomerations were thus dropped because these only housed one or two company 
headquarters in both 2006 and 2011. However, underscoring the concentration of corporate 
power in a limited set of metropolitan regions, this reduction only caused a minimal reduction 
of the turnover and market value contained in the original data: in both cases more than 90% 
of the initial value is retained in the final dataset. A summary of the transformed data is given 
in Table 1. The number of firms thus fell to 1,722 in 2006 and to 1,680 in 2011, while the 
number of urban agglomerations fell to 151 (world) and 43 (Europe) respectively. The table 
already hints at the overall, relative decline of European cities in the global metropolitan 
system in this period. For instance, while the market value of the firms headquartered in 
Europe increased with 8.3% between 2006-2011, this stands at 19.3% for the firms 
headquartered in other parts of the world.  
Table 1: Summary of data used in the 2006-2011 comparison 
  Number of HQs Revenue (billion USD) 
Market value (billion 
USD) 
  2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 
World 1,680 1,722 28,999 21,806 32,991 27,998 
Europe 406 428 9,229 7,150 8,541 7,858 
In order to explore change at the level of individual cities, two sets of calculations are 
required. First, for each city we calculated a single measure of ‘command-and-control’ CAC 
through a linear combination of the percentage of headquarters, market value and turnover 
associated with that city in both 2006 and 2011. This combination of variables controls for 
situations where there is an imbalance of a given component, e.g. cities with few 
headquarters, but with major levels of turnover (or the other way round). Thus the CAC of 
Tokyo, still the dominant command-and-control centre in the global economy (Taylor and 
Csomós, 2012), fell from 10.3% to 8.4% between 2006 and 2011, while Beijing’s CAC rose 
from 1.2% to 3.6% in the same period. 
The second step is the calculation of a meaningful measure of CAC change. Although a 
straightforward way to gauge this change would be to simply look at the change in a city’s 
CAC in and by itself, a better way to do this is to standardize the level of change viz. the 
overall change within the Forbes 2000 data. Mathematical details of this procedure can be 
found in Derudder et al. (2010), but the key point here in terms of interpretation is that the 
statistical distribution of CAC changeconforms to a standard normal distribution with an 
average value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This has the distinct advantage that a city’s 
CAC change can basically be understood as a z-score. For instance, cities with an absolute 
value of >2 have witnessed ‘exceptional’ CAC change when cast in the context of overall 
changes in the level of headquarters, turnover and market value contained within the Forbes 
2000 firms. Note that measures of CAC change depend on the reference framework: in 
contrast to percentage change, CAC values may change when cities are considered in a 
different spatial reference framework. For instance, given declining levels of CAC of 
European cities in the global economy (see below), a city such as Barcelona with a global 
CAC change of around 0 has a positive European CAC change.  
Results 
Before turning to geographical variegation within Europe, we look at some notable CAC 
changes from a global perspective. Figure 1 maps CAC change of the 151 cities in our data, 
while Table 2 lists the 10 cities with the most substantial positive/negative CAC change. In 
line with the anticipated geographical shift in the world-economy from ‘West’ to ‘East’ (e.g. 
Arrighi 1994; Frank 1998), Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest that especially Asian cities have 
acquired larger proportions of CAC, while particularly US and European cities have lost 
CAC. At the same time, however, the picture is much more variegated than a simple west-to-
east shift (see also Derudder et al., 2011), with Tokyo and Osaka losing major shares of their 
CAC, Brazilian and Australian cities acquiring more CAC, and variegation within the US and 
Europe (e.g. Paris and Zug in Europe, and San Jose and Calgary in North America). San Jose, 
for instance, has seen a major increase in its level of CAC as information technology 
companies (with Apple as the prime, but not the sole example) headquartered in this city have 
dramatically increased their market value. It is, however, especially the three leading Chinese 
cities that have acquired more CAC functions. Beijing, for instance, housed the headquarters 
of a total of 15 firms in the Forbes list in 2006, representing a turnover of 203.99 billion USD 
and a market value of 468.41 billion US. In 2011, a total of 38 Forbes firms had their 
corporate headquarters in Beijing, representing a turnover of 923.02 billion USD and a market 
value of 1,734.90 billion USD. In general, then, changes in cities’ CAC function seem to 
broadly replicate broader sea changes in the global economy, with European cities losing 
CAC over the global economy.  
Table 2: Top 10 positive and negative values of CAC change in a global framework 
Rank Top 10 positive changes Top 10 negative changes 
1 Beijing 7.91 Tokyo  -2.03 
2 Hong Kong 3.30 Detroit  -1.55 
3 Shanghai 3.23 London  -1.48 
4 Seoul 2.62 New York -1.46 
5 Sao Paulo 2.12 Cincinnati -1.44 
6 Moscow 2.12 Philadelphia -1.40 
7 Mumbai 1.80 Amsterdam -1.35 
8 Paris 1.33 Osaka -1.27 
9 Rio de Janeiro 1.24 Atlanta -1.10 
10 San Jose 1.01 Richmond -1.09 
Figure 1: CAC change in a global framework  
 
To paint a more detailed picture of the variegation amongst European cities, we recalculated 
CAC change in a European spatial reference framework. Figure 2 maps this CAC change, 
while Table 3 lists the 10 cities with the most substantial positive/negative CAC change. In 
line with changes at the global level (Table 2), especially Moscow and Paris have acquired 
more CAC functions in the context of the European metropolitan system. For instance, while 
the number of Forbes 2000 firms headquartered in Paris remained stable, these firms gained in 
market value (+4%) and especially turnover (+33%). The reason for this rise can be attributed 
to a mix of changes in the banking sector (e.g. BNP Paribas acquiring Fortis), energy firms 
banking on surging oil and gas prices (e.g. Total), and oligopolistic margins and global 
expansion of firms in utility sectors (e.g. GDF Suez and EDF Group). The rising market value 
and turnover of firms active in the energy is also the main driver of Moscow’s growth: in 
2006 only Lukoil and Gazprom featured in the Forbes 2000 list, while in 2011 the turnover 
and market value of five Moscow energy firms was included. 
Meanwhile, the banking crisis has brought about some of the main significant drops in CAC. 
Reykjavik, for instance, headquartered in 2006 three banks listed in the Forbes ranking 
(Islandsbanki, Kaupthing Bank, Landsbanki Islands). Following the 2008 banking crisis, the 
Icelandic banking sector collapsed and all three banks dropped from the Forbes 2000 (Wade 
and Sigurgeirsdottir, 2012). London and Amsterdam have witnessed by far the largest drop in 
CAC. In both cases, this decline was especially due to the falling number of headquarters of 
firms listed in the Forbes dataset (e.g. from 87 to 65 for the London case), and also because 
major losses in the market value of banks. 
In principle, the tables and maps presented here can be used as a general backcloth for 
reference in terms of changing CAC functions of and in the European metropolitan system as 
the consecutive financial crises morph into geographically uneven waves of economic 
recession in Europe. However, we emphasize that this structuralist account of the crisis is but 
one specific vantage point in the analysis of the spatial variegation of the impacts of the 
global financial crisis in Europe. Hadjimichalis (2011), for instance, presents a similar 
account from the perspective of socio-spatial justice and solidarity, while Smith and Swain 
(2011) explore models of development in Eastern Europe in the context of the crisis
1
. 
Table 3: Top 10 positive and negative values of CAC change in a European framework 
Rank Top 10 positive changes Top 10 negative changes 
1 Moscow 3.79 London -2.59 
2 Paris 2.16 Amsterdam -2.13 
3 Dublin 1.84 Milan -0.84 
4 Zug 1.31 Essen -0.76 
5 Luxembourg 1.00 Berlin -0.73 
6 Stockholm 0.81 Reykjavik -0.72 
7 Schaffhausen 0.52 Birmingham -0.70 
8 Lausanne 0.41 Stuttgart -0.63 
9 Munich 0.34 Madrid -0.62 
10 Vienna 0.34 Turin -0.53 
Figure 2: CAC change in a European framework 
 The headquarter conundrum 
Over and above these formative interpretations, however, the results also suggest that CAC 
associated with MNE headquarters are perhaps (increasingly) unsuitable to understand the 
very concept of CAC in metropolitan systems. This point has been made earlier in conceptual 
and empirical terms. Allen (2010), for instance, has argued that the straightforward 
understanding of CAC as something that a city ’possesses’ is conceptually untenable, while 
Godfrey and Zhou (1999) have shown that the inclusion of regional headquarter paints a more 
nuanced empirical picture of CAC in the global economy (see also Jones, 2002). 
To these earlier observations, we would like to add the increasing significance of the 
separation between ‘virtual’ financial headquarters and ‘actual’ operational headquarters – it 
is the former that is being used by Forbes and in most empirical world cities research, while it 
is the latter that seems to be increasingly relevant. A key example is the takeover of American 
brewer Anheuser-Busch by Belgo-Brazilian brewer InBev. After the takeover, the ‘official’ 
corporate headquarters were retained in Leuven (Belgium) as a sign of respect for “the 
heritage, the source, the romance” of brewing (Modern Brewery Age, 2009), but the de facto 
functional global management office is now located in Manhattan, New York (http://www.ab-
inbev.com/contact.cfm). Such a separation, we suggest, is increasingly popular, 
predominantly for fiscal reasons. 
A number of examples from our analysis corroborate this reading. The CAC increase for 
Dublin, for instance, is very counterintuitive given Ireland’s banking problems and deep 
recession. However, the doubling of ‘Dublin headquarters’ from 7 to 15 that underlying this 
increase is of course not related to the ‘strength’ of the Irish economy, but rather to its 
renewed and even increased role as a de facto tax haven (Dharmapala, 2008). While all 
Forbes firms in 2006 could be credibly suggested to have both their operational as well as 
financial headquarters in Dublin, in 2011 of the 15 firms ‘officially’ headquartered in Dublin 
three had their operational headquarters in the United States, three in the United Kingdom, 
while two United Kingdom firms which were originally registered in Bermuda re-registered 
in Dublin (i.e. Accenture and Ingersoll-Rand). 
The same processes explain the artificial rise of Luxemburg as well as Zug and Schaffhausen 
in Switzerland. The latter examples, however, show that this bifurcation has even reached the 
point that the link between metropolitan economies and CAC is increasingly becoming a 
fictional data feature more than anything else. The case of Zug was recently described in 
Time Magazine (2010). It was shown that literally thousands of companies have recently 
’arrived’ in the sleepy provincial town, including giant MNEs such as Biogen (a 
Massachusetts-based biotech giant) and Transocean (the world’s biggest offshore-oil-drilling 
contractor). Yet both firms continue to run their business from Boston and Houston, 
respectively. The crux is that Swiss officials ’assume’ that foreign companies pay taxes where 
they produce, while the 20-minute train trip to Zurich suffices to reach sophisticated — and 
discreet — banks. However, even this trip is often unnecessary, „since their ’headquarters’ 
exist entirely within the stolid post office building, whose hall holds thousands of postboxes 
retained by foreign companies” 
(http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2040142,00.html). 
In the past world city scholars could treat firms headquartered in the Cayman Islands, 
Bermuda or Liechtenstein as ‘exceptions’ because these were essentially offshore 
constructions. However, the ‘optimization’ of corporate structures to minimize, or even totally 
evade, corporate tax, seems to have prompted a broader movement towards a distinction 
between operational and ‘official’ headquarters. In addition to changes in the European 
metropolitan system of MNE-produced CAC, then, our calculations increasingly measure 
specific features of corporate structures. Combined with the insights of Godfrey and Zhou 
(1999) and Allen (2010), then, a key question for world city scholars is at what point this 
distinction becomes so widespread that it totally disallows analyses such as those by Alderson 
and Beckfield (2004) and Taylor et al. (2009).  
Conclusions: the future(s) of European cities 
Dunford and Yeung (2011) recently pointed out that the combination of a faltering European 
economic recovery on the one hand, and a sustained economic growth of China and other 
emerging economies on the other hand has the potential to profoundly alter a number of 
global imbalances. They suggest that if the situation that has emerged between 2008 and the 
time of writing of this commentary persists, we may even see a reverse in the economic gaps 
created by the combined effect of the industrial revolution, colonialism and imperialism. 
Although these global imbalances have been so profound for so long now that an actual 
reverse is not on the immediate horizon, it is clear that the global financial crisis has indeed 
been acting as a major catalyst for a larger geo-economic sea change with Europe on the 
losing end. These changes have myriad different causes and implications, but in this 
commentary we have restricted ourselves to a straightforward description of one particular 
example: the (changing) degree to which European cities are functioning as the territorial 
platforms from which the world’s major MNEs are being run. In spite of the caveats of this 
analysis (e.g. the financial/operational HQ distinction, the problem of the myth of ‘global 
management’ as emphasized by Jones (2002), etc.), our results clearly expound the declining 
command-and-control capacity of most European cities. 
What are the potential consequences for European cities if this decline persists? In his well-
known treatise of the ‘Informational City’, Castells (1992, see also 1996 and 2002 for a 
follow-up and a deepening of the argument) argues that throughout the last two decades of the 
20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, a whole matrix of social and economic 
trends have (unevenly) restructured European cities. A key change, according to Castells 
(2002), was the emergence of firms and other key actors that used cities’ informational 
potential and new communication technologies to extend and deepen their global reach, which 
has in turn been facilitated by ever-increasing deregulation throughout the global economy. 
This has resulted in the rise of a number of cities that are ‘successful’ in the advanced 
producer services economy and high technology manufacturing, while some old dominant 
industrial regions have not been able to make such transition to the informational economy. 
Castells emphasizes that the ‘Informational City’ is closely related to the ‘Global City’ 
concept aka the command-and-control centres explored in this paper, as this articulates the 
directional functions of the global economy in a network of decision-making and information 
processing centres. And finally, and as frequently debated in the urban literature (see Sassen, 
1991; Hamnett, 1996), the ‘Informational City’/’Global City’ also became an increasingly 
‘Dual City’ in that these processes inhibit a structural tendency to generate a polarized 
occupational structure, broadly in line with the informational capabilities of different social 
groups. 
Given the decline of European cities as command-and-control centres, we may well be on the 
verge of a new matrix of social and economic trends that will once again (unevenly) 
restructure European cities. The closely inter-related concepts of Informational City/Global 
City/Dual City may therefore and thereby no longer be the most appropriate background for 
conceptualizing urban processes in Europe’s major metropolitan centres: if the spatial 
evolution of European cities is indeed a historically specific expression of a broader structural 
transformation of urban and economic forms and processes, it is likely that European cities 
are facing some significant transformations.  
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1. In addition, there have been analyses of the shifting geographies of (un)employment in the 
wake of the crisis, such as those by Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir (2011, Iceland) and Blažek 
and Netrdová (2011, Central and Eastern Europe) the global financial crisis. 
 
